Brandon TurbevilleActivist Post
July 13, 2016
In yet another step towards the establishment of a world military force that seeks peace through the absence of dissent, the United States announced its support in May for a set of principles that will allow the United Nations’ peacekeeping troops and UN police to use force in order to “protect civilians” in combat zones and areas of armed conflict.
U.S. Ambassador the U.N. and notorious warmonger against Libya and Syria, Samantha Power stated that the Kigali Principles would “make peacekeeping missions more effective, improve security and save lives."
"The Kigali Principles are designed to make sure that civilians are not abandoned by the international community again," said Power.
The Kigali Principles call for countries who contribute troops to UN missions to give UN Peacekeeping Commanders the authority to use military force against “armed actors with clear hostile intent to harm civilians” without waiting for approval from the United Nations and its member states.
"If a commander has to wait hours and hours for guidance from capital, it may mean not being able to react in time to repel a fast-approaching attack on a nearby village," Power added.
The Kigali initiative was introduced by the United States, the Netherlands, and Rwanda in 2015.
According to a report from the Military Times, U.N. peacekeeping forces from the 29 countries signing on to the principles are now required to act if civilians are in danger.
29 countries represents less than a third of United Nations members and include:
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Canada, Djibouti, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malawi, Montenegro, Netherlands, Niger, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Ukraine, Uganda, United States, Uruguay and Zambia
Notably absent from the list of signatories is Russia, China, Iran, and Lebanon as well as a number of other "anti" NATO countries.
The possibility of United Nations’ forces being used as a wider and seemingly more “official” and credible invading force is very real, especially in places like Syria where, despite all evidence to the contrary, the United States, GCC, the West in general and the United Nations continually harp about “Assad’s crimes against humanity and civilians” while ignoring the crimes of the Western-backed terrorists who have run rampant across the country, displaying a clear institutional bias against states like Syria who operate outside of the totally control of the Anglo-European, Anglo-American banking axis.
Likewise, many civilians may be as worried about the U.N. peacekeepers as they are of their own despotic governments and warlords after a trail of sexual abuse, rapes, assaults, and murders have been left in the U.N’s wake in places like Haiti, Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Central African Republic.
The Kigali Principles are as follows:
We, the troop and police contributing countries, following the International Conference on the Protection of Civilians held in Kigali, from 28-29 May 2015 under the theme “Protection of Civilians through Peacekeeping: From Mandates Design to Implementation”; bringing together the top 30 troop and police contributing countries, the top ten financial contributing countries and other stakeholders; and after deliberations on how to effectively implement the Protection of Civilians mandates in peacekeeping operations, pledge the following:
1. To train all of our troops on the protection of civilians prior to their deployment to missions.
2. To ensure that our sector and contingent-commanders, as well as our nominees for mission leadership positions, have a high level of training and preparedness on peacekeeping operations and, in particular, the protection of civilians.
3. To be prepared to use force to protect civilians, as necessary and consistent with the mandate. Such action encompasses making a show of force as a deterrent; inter-positioning our forces between armed actors and civilians; and taking direct military action against armed actors with clear hostile intent to harm civilians.
4. Not to stipulate caveats or other restrictions that prevent us from fulfilling our responsibility to protect civilians in accordance with the mandate.
5. To identify and communicate to the UN any resource and capability gaps that inhibit our ability to protect civilians.
6. To strive, within our capabilities, to contribute the enabling capabilities (e.g. helicopters) to peacekeeping operations that facilitate improved civilian protection.
7. To avoid undue delay in protecting civilians, by investing our contingent commander with the authority to use force to protect civilians in urgent situations without the need for further consultations with capital.
8. Not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians, in accordance with the rules of engagement, in the absence of an effective host government response or demonstrated willingness to carry out its responsibilities to protect civilians.
9. To demand clarity from the UN and mission leadership on our rules of engagement, including under which circumstances the use of force is appropriate.
10. To seek to identify, as early as possible, potential threats to civilians and proactively take steps to mitigate such threats and otherwise reduce the vulnerability of the civilian population.
11. To seek to enhance the arrangements for rapid deployment, including by supporting a full review of the UN’s standby arrangements, exploring a system in which earmarked units from troop and police contributing countries could be placed in readiness in order to ensure rapid troop deployment, and encouraging the utilisation of partnerships with regional organisations such as the African Union and its RECs.
12. To be vigilant in monitoring and reporting any human rights abuses or signs of impending violence in the areas in which our personnel serve.
13. To take disciplinary action against our own personnel if and when they fail to act to protect civilians when circumstances warrant such action.
14. To undertake our own review, in parallel to any after-action review, in the event that our personnel are unable to protect civilians, and identify and share key lessons for avoiding such failures in the future.
15. To hold our own personnel to the highest standard of conduct, and to vigorously investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute any incidents of abuse.
16. To better implement protection of civilians mandates and deliver on our responsibilities, we request better, regular and more extensive consultations on the mandating of peacekeeping missions. When mandates of peacekeeping missions are under review and may change, it should also be mandatory for the Security Council to consult all troop and police contributing countries deployed to the mission. We commit to bring our own ideas and solutions to these consultations that can strengthen the implementation of protection of civilians mandates.
17. To urge the Security Council to ensure that mandates are matched with the requisite resources, and to commit to support a process that addresses the current critical resource gaps in several missions. We support a more phased mandating process that can ensure a better alignment of resources and mandates.
18. Noting that any well-planned mandate implementation may be undermined by inefficient mobility, logistics or support; To call for effective support of all military plans, including contingency plans; and to commit to work with the Secretariat to review the current support arrangements, including possible transfer of authority over more of the logistical capability to the military component, where appropriate.
Recommend that these principles be endorsed on a voluntary basis and that the signatories meet once each year to discuss how to further improve the implementation of the Protection of Civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping operations.
Brandon Turbeville – article archive here – is the author of seven books, Codex Alimentarius — The End of Health Freedom, 7 Real Conspiracies, Five Sense Solutions and Dispatches From a Dissident, volume 1 andvolume 2, The Road to Damascus: The Anglo-American Assault on Syria, and The Difference it Makes: 36 Reasons Why Hillary Clinton Should Never Be President. Turbeville has published over 650 articles on a wide variety of subjects including health, economics, government corruption, and civil liberties. Brandon Turbeville’s radio show Truth on The Tracks can be found every Monday night 9 pm EST at UCYTV. His website is BrandonTurbeville.com He is available for radio and TV interviews. Please contact activistpost (at) gmail.com.
This article may be freely shared in part or in full with author attribution and source link.
Image Credit: American Intelligence Report
The possibility of United Nations’ forces being used as a wider and seemingly more “official” and credible invading force is very real, especially in places like Syria where, despite all evidence to the contrary, the United States, GCC, the West in general and the United Nations continually harp about “Assad’s crimes against humanity and civilians” while ignoring the crimes of the Western-backed terrorists who have run rampant across the country, displaying a clear institutional bias against states like Syria who operate outside of the totally control of the Anglo-European, Anglo-American banking axis.
Likewise, many civilians may be as worried about the U.N. peacekeepers as they are of their own despotic governments and warlords after a trail of sexual abuse, rapes, assaults, and murders have been left in the U.N’s wake in places like Haiti, Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Central African Republic.
The Kigali Principles are as follows:
We, the troop and police contributing countries, following the International Conference on the Protection of Civilians held in Kigali, from 28-29 May 2015 under the theme “Protection of Civilians through Peacekeeping: From Mandates Design to Implementation”; bringing together the top 30 troop and police contributing countries, the top ten financial contributing countries and other stakeholders; and after deliberations on how to effectively implement the Protection of Civilians mandates in peacekeeping operations, pledge the following:
1. To train all of our troops on the protection of civilians prior to their deployment to missions.
2. To ensure that our sector and contingent-commanders, as well as our nominees for mission leadership positions, have a high level of training and preparedness on peacekeeping operations and, in particular, the protection of civilians.
3. To be prepared to use force to protect civilians, as necessary and consistent with the mandate. Such action encompasses making a show of force as a deterrent; inter-positioning our forces between armed actors and civilians; and taking direct military action against armed actors with clear hostile intent to harm civilians.
4. Not to stipulate caveats or other restrictions that prevent us from fulfilling our responsibility to protect civilians in accordance with the mandate.
5. To identify and communicate to the UN any resource and capability gaps that inhibit our ability to protect civilians.
6. To strive, within our capabilities, to contribute the enabling capabilities (e.g. helicopters) to peacekeeping operations that facilitate improved civilian protection.
7. To avoid undue delay in protecting civilians, by investing our contingent commander with the authority to use force to protect civilians in urgent situations without the need for further consultations with capital.
8. Not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians, in accordance with the rules of engagement, in the absence of an effective host government response or demonstrated willingness to carry out its responsibilities to protect civilians.
9. To demand clarity from the UN and mission leadership on our rules of engagement, including under which circumstances the use of force is appropriate.
10. To seek to identify, as early as possible, potential threats to civilians and proactively take steps to mitigate such threats and otherwise reduce the vulnerability of the civilian population.
11. To seek to enhance the arrangements for rapid deployment, including by supporting a full review of the UN’s standby arrangements, exploring a system in which earmarked units from troop and police contributing countries could be placed in readiness in order to ensure rapid troop deployment, and encouraging the utilisation of partnerships with regional organisations such as the African Union and its RECs.
12. To be vigilant in monitoring and reporting any human rights abuses or signs of impending violence in the areas in which our personnel serve.
13. To take disciplinary action against our own personnel if and when they fail to act to protect civilians when circumstances warrant such action.
14. To undertake our own review, in parallel to any after-action review, in the event that our personnel are unable to protect civilians, and identify and share key lessons for avoiding such failures in the future.
15. To hold our own personnel to the highest standard of conduct, and to vigorously investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute any incidents of abuse.
16. To better implement protection of civilians mandates and deliver on our responsibilities, we request better, regular and more extensive consultations on the mandating of peacekeeping missions. When mandates of peacekeeping missions are under review and may change, it should also be mandatory for the Security Council to consult all troop and police contributing countries deployed to the mission. We commit to bring our own ideas and solutions to these consultations that can strengthen the implementation of protection of civilians mandates.
17. To urge the Security Council to ensure that mandates are matched with the requisite resources, and to commit to support a process that addresses the current critical resource gaps in several missions. We support a more phased mandating process that can ensure a better alignment of resources and mandates.
18. Noting that any well-planned mandate implementation may be undermined by inefficient mobility, logistics or support; To call for effective support of all military plans, including contingency plans; and to commit to work with the Secretariat to review the current support arrangements, including possible transfer of authority over more of the logistical capability to the military component, where appropriate.
Recommend that these principles be endorsed on a voluntary basis and that the signatories meet once each year to discuss how to further improve the implementation of the Protection of Civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping operations.
Brandon Turbeville – article archive here – is the author of seven books, Codex Alimentarius — The End of Health Freedom, 7 Real Conspiracies, Five Sense Solutions and Dispatches From a Dissident, volume 1 andvolume 2, The Road to Damascus: The Anglo-American Assault on Syria, and The Difference it Makes: 36 Reasons Why Hillary Clinton Should Never Be President. Turbeville has published over 650 articles on a wide variety of subjects including health, economics, government corruption, and civil liberties. Brandon Turbeville’s radio show Truth on The Tracks can be found every Monday night 9 pm EST at UCYTV. His website is BrandonTurbeville.com He is available for radio and TV interviews. Please contact activistpost (at) gmail.com.
This article may be freely shared in part or in full with author attribution and source link.
Image Credit: American Intelligence Report
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